



Metaphor comprehension in children with and without autism spectrum disorder. 
 
Abstract 
Metaphor comprehension was studied in three groups of children from 6-12 years old: a group with 
autism spectrum disorder with level 2 severity (ASD, n=22) and two comparison groups with typical 
development: one matched with the ASD group on chronological age (TCD group, n=22) and the 
other matched on linguistic age (TLD group, n=22). The TCD group performed better than the TLD 
group, which performed better than the ASD group, on the comprehension of both conventional and 
novel metaphors, with better performance found on conventional metaphors than on novel ones. We 
suggest that both linguistic and extralinguistic competencies (usually limited in level 2 ASD) would be 
necessary for understanding metaphors, which would be facilitated by their frequency and familiarity. 
 
Highlights: 
Metaphor comprehension was worse in children with ASD than in younger TD children matched on 
LA. 
Metaphor comprehension was worse in children with ASD than in TD children matched on CA. 





Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by 
impairments in social interaction and communication across multiple contexts and by the presence of 
repetitive and stereotyped behaviors (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association -APA-, 2013). The 
severity of these two criteria determines the severity of the disorder, with three possible levels, 1, 2, 
and 3: level 1 would be the least severe (the person needs support), and level 3 would be the most 
severe (the person needs considerable support). When diagnosing ASD, it is necessary to determine 
whether there is another disorder or associated condition, such as a language impairment. Although 
some individuals with autism have preserved structural language skills (morphology, syntax, and 
phonology), pragmatic and non-literal language skills are generally affected across the autism 
spectrum (Baixauli-Fortea, Miranda-Casas, Berenguer-Forner, Colomer-Diago, & Roselló-Miranda, 
2019; Gold & Faust, 2010; Ramberg, Ehlers, Nydén, Johansson & Gillberg, 2011). 
The comprehension of non-literal (or non-explicit) language -including figurative language- 
requires the ability to go beyond what is explicitly stated. Difficulties in this ability can interfere with the 
natural flow of social interactions and impair communication (Swineford, Thurm, Baird, Wetherby & 
Swedo, 2014), thus constituting a risk factor for the occurrence of certain situations, such as 
victimization, especially in children and adolescents (Paul, 2015). Therefore, it is particularly important 
to study this type of language in vulnerable populations, such as individuals with ASD, whose 
difficulties with figurative language have been documented (Kalandadze, Norbury, Nærland & Næss, 
2018; Vulchanova, Saldaña, Chahboun & Vulchanov, 2015). 
Metaphors are some of the most common examples of figurative language. In this paper, we 
will follow the proposals of Lakoff & Johnson (2003), corroborated by Gibbs, Beitel, Harrington & 
Sanders (1994), Gibbs & Colston (1995), Mandler (1988, 1995, 2005, 2010), or Richardson, Spivey, 
Barsalou & McRae (2003). For these authors, the metaphor is a cognitive resource that involves 
linking two apparently unrelated knowledge domains (the base term and the target term), functioning 
as an everyday tool to explain one domain in terms of another. The metaphor makes it possible to 
organize experience based on familiar concepts through a relationship of similarity between the 
domains involved. The metaphor is not, therefore, a poetic resource, but rather a way of categorizing 
reality, and it can be present in very frequent expressions. 
Metaphor comprehension in children with and without ASD 
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The comprehension of figurative language, and specifically metaphors, is a gradual process 
that, in children with typical development (TD), begins in early childhood, between three and four 
years old, and continues throughout adolescence, culminating in adulthood (Cacciari, 2014; 
Özçalişkan, 2005; Reyna & Kiernan, 1995; Rundblad & Annaz, 2010a; Winner, 1997). According to 
Pouscoulous (2011), the development of linguistic skills, the accumulation of knowledge and 
experiences about the world, and the development of mentalist skills and social comprehension, all of 
which take place with age, occur in parallel with better comprehension of figurative language and, 
particularly, metaphoric language. 
However, children with ASD usually tend to make literal interpretations of statements, 
presenting difficulties in the comprehension of figurative language and, specifically, metaphoric 
language, as revealed in the meta-analytic review carried out by Kalandadze et al., (2018). The 41 
articles included in this study compared figurative language in subjects with and without ASD, with 
metaphors specifically addressed in 15 of the articles. The majority of the studies that compared 
metaphor comprehension in individuals with and without ASD used subjects between 6 and 12 years 
old, as in the present study. In all of them, better performance on metaphor comprehension was 
obtained in children with TD than in children with ASD (Adachi et al., 2004; De Villiers et al., 2011; 
Dennis, Lazenby & Lockyer, 2001; Huang, Oi & Taguchi, 2015; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Mashal & 
Kasirer, 2011; Olofson et al., 2014; Rundblad & Annaz, 2010b; Zheng, Jia & Liang, 2015). All these 
studies used the equating strategy of matching the groups on chronological age (CA). Moreover, in 
four studies (Adachi et al., 2004; De Villiers et al., 2011; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Zheng et al., 2015), 
the groups were also matched on verbal IQ, in one study (Huang et al., 2015), they were matched on 
vocabulary, and in only one study (Mashal & Kasirer, 2011), they were also matched on linguistic age 
(LA). 
In this meta-analytic review (Kalandadze et al., 2018), the largest between-group differences 
and the largest mean effect sizes were obtained in the studies where the groups were matched on 
CA, but not on indicators of linguistic ability (Dennis et al., 2001; Olofson et al., 2014; Rundblad & 
Annaz, 2010b). However, when the groups were matched on indicators of linguistic skills, in addition 
to CA, the differences between groups and the effect sizes were smaller. These results provide 
evidence that figurative language comprehension deficits could be related to the individual’s structural 
(grammar and semantic) language skills, such as vocabulary and syntax (Gernsbacher & Pripas-
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Kapit, 2012; Norbury, 2004, 2005; Whyte, Nelson & Scherf, 2014). More specifically, they support the 
critical role of core language skills in the comprehension of metaphors (Pouscoulous, 2014). 
However, in the studies included in the meta-analysis by Kalandadze et al. (2018) that 
matched the groups on CA and indicators of linguistic skills, although the between-group differences 
and mean effect sizes were small, they continued to be statistically significant. Likewise, in other more 
recent studies –which included other age groups- an atypical (delayed) processing of metaphoric 
language was obtained in people with level 1 ASD with intact formal linguistic skills (Chahboun, 
Vulchanov, Saldaña, Eshuis, & Vulchanova, 2016, 2017; Chouinard & Cummine, 2016). Therefore, in 
addition to formal linguistic competence, other cognitive skills (extralinguistic) would be involved in 
metaphor comprehension, such as mind reading, social comprehension, executive functioning (Landa 
& Goldberg 2005), and context processing (Vulchanova et al., 2015), skills that can be limited or 
compromised in ASD (Baixauli-Fortea et al., 2019; Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006; Hill, 
2004; Ozonoff, 1997). In fact, in the initial studies on metaphors in ASD, the theory of mind (the 
capacity to interpret the speaker's mental states) was a prominent factor (Happé, 1993, 1995). Other 
proposals were weak central coherence (a limited ability to attend to the overall form or meaning, 
understand context, or "see the big picture") and executive dysfunction (deficits in a set of cognitive 
abilities involved in goal formulation, planning, organization, sequencing, and self-regulation) as 
possible factors involved in the difficulties of children with ASD in understanding metaphors (Huang et 
al., 2015; Kasirer & Mashal, 2014; Mashal & Kasirer, 2011; Rundblad & Annaz, 2010b). 
With regard to the developmental course, age is a variable that does not seem to be 
significantly associated with an improvement in metaphor comprehension in children with ASD, unlike 
in children with TD (Huang et al., 2015; Kalandadze et al., 2018; Olofson et al., 2014; Rundblad & 
Annaz, 2010b; Van Herwegen & Rundblad, 2018; Whyte & Nelson, 2015). Thus, individuals with ASD 
did not show the same evolution in metaphor comprehension throughout childhood and adolescence 
as individuals with TD, with the former remaining at floor performance into adolescence, which has 
been labeled a zero trajectory (Rundblad & Annaz, 2010b). However, in the cross-sectional studies by 
Chahboun et al. (2016, 2017), an improvement with age was found in high cognitive and verbal 
functioning individuals with autism. 
As Kalandadze et al. (2018) suggests, a novel and useful methodological approach to 
examine whether figurative language –and, particularly, metaphoric language- is developmentally 
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delayed or deviant in children with ASD involves including one ASD group and two TD comparison 
groups: one matched on CA and another matched on LA. Comparing the three groups will make it 
possible to clarify the greater or lesser weight of factors related to age, linguistic competence, or the 
ASD itself in the comprehension of metaphors, which is usually associated with the presence of 
extralinguistic differences. 
Conventional and novel metaphors 
Not all metaphors require the same level of processing (at linguistic, contextual, and cognitive 
levels). According to the Career of Metaphor Model (Bowle & Gentner, 2005), metaphors can vary in 
terms of conventionality/novelty. Conventional metaphors (or lexicalized) are familiar, frequent, and 
prototypical. Because they are stored in the mental lexicon, their understanding requires a lexical 
retrieval process. They have a fixed meaning that has to be retrieved from stored knowledge in 
memory. By contrast, novel metaphors are new, original, creative, not familiar, and infrequent. Their 
meaning may be discerned without prior familiarity or explanation, requiring a dynamic and creative 
process based on the constituent words and the comparison of the concepts they express. Whereas 
conventional metaphors are understood through categorization, novel metaphors are understood 
through comparison (matching). 
The Career of Metaphor Model (Bowle & Gentner, 2005) posits that the comprehension of 
conventional metaphors is less demanding, in terms of cognitive and linguistic resources, than the 
comprehension of novel metaphors, given that the former, because they are more familiar and 
frequent, are processed more quickly and easily than the latter. However, studies carried out with 
children comparing the two types of metaphors have obtained inconsistent results. Thus, although 
some studies found better performance on the comprehension of conventional metaphors than on 
novel ones (Gold, Faust & Goldstein, 2010; Zheng et al., 2015), others obtained similar performance 
on both types of metaphors (Kasirer & Mashall, 2016, only in the TD group; Mashall & Kasirer, 2011, 
2012; Olofson et al., 2014), and some even found better performance on the comprehension of novel 
metaphors than on conventional ones (Chahboun et al., 2017; Kasirer & Mashall, 2016, only in the 
ASD group). 
In addition, when comparing the groups, children with TD usually obtain better performance 
than children with ASD on the comprehension of conventional metaphors (Mashal & Kasirer, 2011, 
Minshew, Goldstein & Siegal, 1995). However, in the comprehension of novel metaphors, whereas 
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some studies also obtained better performance in children with TD (Chahboun et al., 2016; Gold et 
al., 2010; Olofson et al., 2014; Van Herwegen & Rundblad, 2018), other studies found that the 
performance on novel metaphors was similar in both groups (Kasirer & Mashall, 2016; Mashall & 
Kasirer, 2011, 2012; Melogno, D’Ardia, Pinto & Levi, 2012; Zheng et al., 2015). 
Objectives of the present study 
The main objective of the present study was to evaluate the metaphor comprehension (both 
overall and depending on the degree of conventionality/novelty) in a sample of children with and 
without ASD. A novel contribution of our study is that the children with ASD in our sample had level 2 
severity, whereas the children included in the samples of almost all the previous studies on figurative 
language were from level 1, in many cases with high cognitive and verbal functioning. Therefore, our 
study focuses on a type of population in which figurative language has hardly been studied, and so 
we address a part of the autism spectrum that differs from what has commonly been studied. 
Furthermore, in this study, we used a methodological approach that represents an improvement over 
most of the previous studies because it includes, in addition to the ASD group, two comparison 
groups: a TD matched on CA with the ASD group but with a higher LA (called TCD), and a TD group 
matched on LA with the ASD group but with a lower CA (called TLD). 
The specific objectives of the present study were the following: 
Objective 1. Determine whether there were differences among the three groups of children on 
the overall performance obtained on the metaphor test. 
Objective 2. Determine whether there were differences among the three groups of children on 
the performance obtained on each of the two types of metaphors (conventional and novel) included in 
the metaphor test. 
Objective 3. Determine whether, within each group, there were differences in the performance 
obtained on the two types of metaphors (conventional and novel). 
Method 
Participants 
 The participants in the present study were 66 elementary school children between 6 and 12 
years old, of European Caucasian descent, and with a medium socioeconomic status. They were all 
native Spanish speakers, and they were divided into three groups: a group of children with an ASD 
diagnosis (ASD group), a group of children with TD matched with the ASD group on CA (TCD group), 
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and a group of children with TD matched with the ASD group on LA (TLD group). To assess the LA, 
the Peabody test (Dunn, Dunn & Arribas, 2006) was used in all cases. 
- The ASD group was composed of 18 males and 4 females, with a mean CA of 10.92 years 
(SD = 1.19) and a mean LA of 8.28 years (SD = 1.88). 
- The TCD group was composed of 16 males and 6 females, with a mean CA of 10.89 years 
(SD = 1.02) and a mean LA of 11.48 years (SD = 1.55). 
- The TLD group was composed of 16 males and 6 females, with a mean CA of 8.35 years (SD 
= 0.32) and a mean LA of 8.64 years (SD = 2.02). 
 No statistically significant differences in CA were found between the ASD and TCD groups 
[F(1,42) = .011, p = .916, η2p = .001], or in the LA between the ASD and TLD groups [F(1,42) = .375, p 
=.543, η2p = .001]. Moreover, no statistically significant differences were found between the CA and LA 
in the TCD group [F (1,21) = .40, p = .056, η2p = .163] or in the TLD group [F (1,21) = 1.59, p = .221, η2p = 
.070]. Finally, no statistically significant differences were found among the three groups on gender (χ2= 
0.518, p = .472) or performance IQ [F (2,63) = .57, p .947, η2 p= .002], with a performance IQ (evaluated 
with the Raven test) above 85 in all cases. 
 Children in the ASD group had a clinical diagnosis of ASD, according to the DSM-5 (APA, 
2013), and they met the diagnostic criteria for level 2. The diagnosis was confirmed using more specific 
instruments, such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & 
Risi, 2000), which was applied by specialized psychologists who had official accreditation to use this 
instrument. In addition, in all cases, the scores obtained on the Social Communication Questionnaire 
(SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) were above 15 (M = 26.07; SD = 7.08). All the children in the ASD 
group attended schools with specific classrooms where the TEACCH (Treatment and Education of 
Autistic and Related Communication Handicapped Children) methodology was used. These 
classrooms, which are included in regular state schools in XXXX, are set up for children with disorders 
that affect language and communication. In the case of the children in the two comparison groups, they 
were children with TD without any clinical diagnosis who attended the same schools as the ASD group, 




The tests were administered in the school, individually, on various days, in a noise- and 
distraction-free office. In all cases, the tasks were administered in the same order (first: the Peabody 
test, second: the metaphors test, which was administered on the computer). 
Ethics Statement 
This study was approved and funded by the University of XXXX and the XXXX (Helsinki 
Declaration in the Convention of the European Council, 1964). The research had the official and 
written authorization of the General Direction and School Management (XXXX Education, Training 
and Employment Department). Moreover, written authorization to carry out the research was obtained 
from the participating schools and the children's parents. 
Instruments 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III, Dunn et al., 2006). The Peabody test is an 
instrument widely used to assess vocabulary knowledge in children. It consists of 192 items: the 
examiner names a word (noun, verb, adjective, etc.), and the child has to point out an image from four 
images presented. We used the equivalent linguistic age score provided by the test. The Peabody 
test is an appropriate test to administer to handicapped individuals with articulation or expressive 
language problems (Bell, Lassiter, Matthews & Hutchinson, 2001), which is the case of the 
participants with ASD in our sample. Moreover, in some studies, the validity of the PPVT has been 
shown by strong correlations between PPVT scores and overall intelligence (Bee & Boyd 2004; Bell et 
al. 2001), even though it has been used in several investigations on ASD to obtain an estimation of 
language ability (e.g. Hala, Pexman & Glenwright, 2007; Lam & Yeung, 2012; Pellicano, 2010; Pring, 
Ryder, Crane & Hermelin, 2010). 
Metaphors Test. This instrument, which has a computerized format, includes a total of 20 
items that can be classified according to their degree of conventionality/novelty (see annex 1). Thus, 
half the items were assigned to the category of conventional metaphors (e.g. “This child is a pig”, 
“This school is a prison”), and the other half were assigned to the category of novel metaphors (e.g. 
“This girl is a lynx”, “My brother is brilliant”). The following procedure was used to place the items in 
the categories (conventional / novel): after consulting documental collections of metaphors in 
Spanish, works of literature, and the media, two experts in Linguistics selected a total of 60 
metaphors. A pilot study was carried out in two phases with a total of 225 children with TD between 6 
and 12 years old who were not part of the sample of the present study. In the first phase, the children 
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were asked to indicate whether or not they knew what each of the 60 expressions meant. The 10 
expressions that obtained the highest percentages of “yes” responses and the 10 expressions that 
obtained the highest percentages of “no” responses were selected for the construction of the test. 
Each of these 20 metaphors was designed as an item. Each item was composed of a statement and 
three possible response options: one option was correct (the figurative target meaning of the 
expression), another option approached the literal meaning of the expression, and another option was 
related to the expression but was not its target meaning. The subject had to point to or indicate which 
of the three response options fit best or corresponded to the sentence in the item. For example, for 
the expression “The boy is sunk”, the response options were: (a) The boy is sad; (b) The boy fell; and 
(c) The boy is little clumsy. To confirm the frequency or familiarity of the items, in the second stage of 
the pilot study, the 20 items were administered to the 225 children. Based on the frequency of hits 
obtained on each item, the items were classified in the two categories: conventional (high frequency 
of hits, above 70%) and novel (low frequency of hits, below 30%). We think this procedure is 
appropriate because the metaphors that present a high frequency of comprehension are familiar, 
almost automatized, and stored in the memory, whereas the metaphors that present low frequency of 
comprehension are new, not familiar, and not stored in the memory. Moreover, because a large 
number of children with ages similar to those in our sample are used –and not adults- we think the 
validity of our procedure is strengthened, given that the criterion of frequency is not based on the 
competence of a group of adults, but rather on that of a group of children. Thus, many metaphors that 
might be conventional (due to their high frequency or familiarity) for adults might not be for children 
the first times they are presented because they are novel to them (with low frequency or familiarity). 
When administering the test to the children in the sample, the test items were presented randomly. 
For each subject, the number of correct answers (the total number and those obtained on each type 
of metaphor) was recorded, as well as the time taken to perform the test. Previously, training on the 
task was provided, administering various items that were different from those on the test in order to 
make sure the subject understood the task. 
Data Analysis 
Data analyses were performed using the SPSS version 24 statistical package. For the first 
objective, two ANOVAs were conducted (one for the number of correct answers, and the other for the 
response time) to compare the overall performance of the three groups of children on the metaphor 
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test. For the second and third objectives, a 2 x 3 mixed variance analysis was conducted, including as 
independent variables: type of metaphor (intra-subject variable) and group (inter-subject variable), 
and as dependent variable, the number of correct answers. The overall effect of each independent 
variable and the interactions between them were analyzed, in order to study group differences in the 
performance obtained on each type of metaphor (objective 2), and within-group differences in the 
performance on the two metaphor types (objective 3). Effect sizes were calculated using partial η2 
values, according to Cohen (1988): η2 = .06, small effect size; η2 = .06 to .14, medium; η2 = .14, large. 
Results 
Objective 1 
Group differences in the overall performance on the metaphor test. 
Table 1 presents the results of the ANOVAs conducted to compare the overall performance of 
the three groups of subjects on the metaphor test, along with pairwise comparisons. The results 
showed statistically significant differences among the three groups. The TCD group showed the best 
performance on both the number of correct answers and the response time, whereas the ASD group 
showed the worst performance. 
-INSERT TABLE 1- 
Objectives 2 and 3 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the groups’ performance on each 
type of metaphor (conventional and novel) included in the metaphor test. The mixed ANOVA showed 
a significant overall effect for the group (F(2,63)= 39.47, p <.001, η2p = .556) and the type of metaphor 
(F(1,63)= 128.47, p <.001, η2p = .671). Overall, the TCD group showed the best performance, whereas 
the ASD group showed the worst performance, and more correct answers were obtained on 
conventional metaphors than on novel metaphors. Moreover, the mixed ANOVA showed a significant 
overall effect of the interaction between the two independent variables (type of metaphor x group) 
(F(2,63)= 6.85, p =.002, η2p = .179). 
-INSERT TABLE 2- 
Regarding objective 2 (analyze group differences in the performance obtained on each type of 
metaphor), statistically significant differences were obtained among the three groups on both novel 
(F(2,63)= 35.30, p <.001, η2p = .528) and conventional metaphors (F(2,63)= 35.32, p <.001, η2p = .529). 
Bonferroni post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that, on each of the two metaphor types, the TCD 
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group obtained more correct answers than the TLD group, and the TLD group obtained more correct 
answers than the ASD group, with statistically significant differences in all cases (p values ranging 
from .01 to <.001). 
Regarding objective 3 (analyze within-group differences in the performance on the two 
metaphor types), statistically significant differences were obtained between the two types of 
metaphors within the three groups (ASD group: F(1,63)= 42.82, p <.001, η2p = .405; TCD group: F(1,63)= 
15.41, p <.001, η2p = .197; and TLD group: F(1,63)= 83.93, p = .571). In all cases, more correct answers 
were obtained on conventional metaphors than on novel metaphors (see Figure 1). 
-INSERT FIGURE 1- 
Discussion 
The main objective of the present study was to evaluate the metaphor comprehension (both 
overall and depending on the degree of conventionality/novelty) in a sample of children with and 
without ASD. To do so, a metaphor test was constructed that included conventional and novel 
metaphors, based on the criterion of frequency / familiarity, as in recent studies (e. g. Chahboun et al., 
2017). 
With regard to the first objective of the present study, the TCD group showed better 
performance on the test than the TLD group, and the latter obtained better performance than the ASD 
group. First, the differences found between the two TD groups indicate the importance of the 
development of both linguistic and extralinguistic skills in metaphor comprehension. Second, the fact 
that the two TD groups performed better than the ASD group would coincide with previous studies 
(see the metanalysis by Kalandadze et al., 2018) that found better performance on metaphor 
comprehension in children with TD than in children with ASD. Third, the differences found between 
the ASD and TCD groups (in favor of the TCD group) which were matched on CA but not on LA, 
would reinforce the critical role of core language skills (grammar and semantics) in the 
comprehension of metaphors (Norbury, 2005; Pouscoulous, 2014). Fourth, the differences found 
between the ASD and TLD groups (in favor of the TLD group) which were matched on LA but not on 
CA, would reinforce the idea that other skills and competencies, apart from linguistic skills, would also 
be involved in the comprehension of metaphors (Vulchanova et al., 2015). Thus, future studies would 
have to investigate whether difficulties in mentalist skills and social comprehension, executive 
dysfunction, weak central coherence, and difficulties in integrating the information in a context, 
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aspects that are commonly found in children with ASD, would be the basis of the limited metaphor 
comprehension found in this group of children. They would fail to integrate the necessary information, 
the speaker's intent, and the rest of the context where all of this must be used (Vulchanova et al., 
2015). The context seems to play a key role in metaphor comprehension, which could justify the 
difficulties in comprehending metaphors in ASD based on recent theoretical approaches such as 
context blindness theory (Vermeulen, 2009). The possible influence of all these extralinguistic 
competencies on the comprehension of metaphors in children with level 2 ASD is a topic that should 
be addressed in future investigations. 
The second and third objectives of the present study address the differentiation between 
conventional and novel metaphors. The comparison of the three groups (objective 2) on the 
comprehension of each type of metaphor yielded similar results to those obtained on the overall 
performance on the test. Thus, on both conventional and novel metaphors, the TCD group obtained 
better performance than the TLD group, which obtained better performance than the ASD group. 
First, the differences found between the two TD groups, in favor of the older ones, would be explained 
by the effect of age and the corresponding development of linguistic and extralinguistic skills. 
Second, the differences found between the ASD group and the two TD groups would agree 
with the literature showing better performance in TD than in ASD on both conventional and novel 
metaphors (Chahboun et al., 2016; Gold et al., 2010; Olofson et al., 2014; Van Herwegen & 
Rundblad, 2018). However, in the case of novel metaphors, our results would not agree with previous 
literature that found similar performance in the two groups (Kasirer & Mashall, 2016; Mashall & 
Kasirer, 2011, 2012; Melogno, D’Ardia, Pinto & Levi, 2012; Zheng et al., 2015). 
In the case of conventional metaphors, the results seem conclusive, in that the children with 
TD perform better than the children with ASD on this type of metaphor. The comprehension of 
conventional metaphors (familiar, frequent) is carried out through categorization, requiring an 
information recovery process from long-term memory. This process –which is mainly guided by 
concepts, or top-down- requires the selection of the relevant or appropriate meaning of the term 
contained in the expression and the suppression of meanings that are irrelevant or inappropriate. It is 
a global process in which children with ASD would present greater limitations than children with TD, 
partly due to weak central coherence (Happé & Frith, 2006; Vulchanova et al., 2015), which could 
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somewhat justify the worse performance of the ASD group, compared to the TD group, on 
conventional metaphors. 
In the case of novel metaphors, because they are original and infrequent, their 
comprehension would not require recovering information from long-term memory; instead, it would 
involve carrying out a comparison in which the semantic features of the base term and the target term 
are extracted and matched to each other, using their attributes to establish the basis for the 
comparison. In this case, the necessary processing is mainly guided by data, or bottom-up. It is a 
local processing (or focused on the details), in which children with ASD can present similar 
performance to children with TD, according to the theories of weak central coherence and enhanced 
perceptual functioning (Happé & Frith, 2006; Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert & Burack, 2006), 
which could partly justify the lack of differences on novel metaphors found between the groups in 
some studies. However, we think this lack of differences would be more likely in ASD with high 
cognitive and verbal functioning, which is not the case in our study (ASD level 2), where higher 
performance was obtained on novel metaphors in the TD groups than in the ASD group. 
The within-group comparison (objective 3) of the two types of metaphors yielded similar 
results in the three groups: performance on conventional metaphors was better than on novel 
metaphors. This result would be consistent with some previous studies (Gold et al., 2010; Zheng et 
al., 2015), and it would support the Career of Metaphor Model (Bowle & Gentner, 2005). In this model, 
the comprehension of conventional metaphors is considered less demanding, in terms of cognitive 
and linguistic resources, than the comprehension of novel metaphors, given that the former, due to 
being more familiar and frequent, do not produce metaphoric tension and are processed more easily 
than the latter. However, other studies obtained different results (Chahboun et al., 2017; Kasirer & 
Mashall, 2016; Mashall & Kasirer, 2011, 2012; Olofson et al., 2014), explained by the degree of 
transparency of the types of metaphors: thus, whereas conventional metaphors are more opaque and 
lexicalized, and their meaning is difficult to infer without a supportive context, novel metaphors are 
transparent, and their meaning may be readily discerned without prior familiarity or explanation. 
Nevertheless, because conventional metaphors have been defined and operationalized as frequent 
and familiar, learning would play a key role in the better performance obtained on conventional 
metaphors than on novel ones. Hence, conventional metaphors, as highly familiar expressions stored 
in the memory, would be better understood than novel metaphors because the access to their 
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meaning based on the term contained in the expression would be practically automatic. However, this 
would not occur with novel metaphors because when a novel metaphor becomes frequent or familiar, 
it turns into a conventional metaphor. 
Conclusions 
The results obtained from the sample of children in our study lead us to draw a series of 
conclusions, which, in some cases, form hypotheses to evaluate in future studies. It can be concluded 
that the understanding of the metaphor is affected by the individuals' language skills, with subjects 
with ASD (level 2) being more affected than subjects with TD, even when they present the same 
linguistic age. This suggests understanding metaphors requires other linguistic skills (grammar and 
semantics) and extralinguistic skills, such as mentalist skills and social comprehension, executive 
skills, central coherence, integration, and contextual processing skills that are usually limited and 
compromised in children with ASD, as other studies have pointed out (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 2000; 
Happé, 1993; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000; Landa & Goldberg, 2005). These skills are even 
more necessary in the case of metaphors that are new to all the groups studied, although the subjects 
with ASD have the greatest difficulties in this regard. Moreover, the degree of the metaphor’s 
frequency or familiarity would be a key factor in its comprehension, so that highly frequent and familiar 
metaphors would be stored in the long-term memory and understood almost automatically, with little 
mental effort, unlike infrequent metaphors. 
Limitations and future research 
Our study has some limitations. First, the specific characteristics of the group of children with 
ASD in our sample limits the reach of the results obtained to only these types of children (ASD level 2, 
between 6 and 12 years old). Thus, the autism spectrum was not completely represented because 
there were no children in the sample with levels 1 and 3. Second, regarding sex, the sample used in 
the present study includes more men than women. Third, because the study is cross-sectional, the 
variables were not studied over time. In the specific case of the children with ASD, by including only 
one group, it was not possible to study the evolution of metaphor comprehension with age. Given that 
contradictory results have been found in this aspect in the scientific literature (e. g. Chahboun et al., 
2016, 2017; Rundblad & Annaz, 2010b; Van Herwegen & Rundblad, 2018), this issue should be 
addressed in future longitudinal studies. Fourth, this study did not have a comparison group with a 
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different psychological disorder, and so we cannot conclude that the differences found compared to 
the TD groups were only attributable to the condition of autism. Fifth, in the evaluation of linguistic 
ability, only one aspect of language was taken into account, specifically, receptive vocabulary. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to carry out studies that include other aspects of language and their 
involvement in figurative language comprehension by subjects with ASD. Sixth, future research will 
have to study -in children with ASD with the characteristics of our sample- the comprehension of other 
types of figurative language (e.g. irony, metonymy…). 
As mentioned above, although it is true that most of the articles published on figurative 
language in children with ASD have used samples with level 1 severity and high cognitive and verbal 
functioning, very few studies on the topic have included children with level 2 ASD. In this regard, our 
study contributes to the research on the topic by filling a gap in the scientific literature and providing 
data on metaphor comprehension in children with ASD with these specific characteristics. 
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Annex 1. Items included in the metaphor test (translated into English). 
What does it mean? Choose the correct response in each case. 
(N) This girl is a fox.  
1) This girl has a fox in her house. 
2) This girl is very sly and alert. 
3) This girl likes to play chess. 
(C) This boy is a pig. 
1) This boy has pigs in his house. 
2) This boy likes to eat ham. 
3) This boy gets very dirty. 
(N) My brother is brilliant. 
1) My brother is very smart. 
2) My brother has a shiny face. 
3) My brother talks a lot. 
(N) I’m up to my eyeballs these days. 
1) I’m very busy. 
2) My eyes hurt. 
3) My eyes are blue. 
(C) This school is a prison. 
1) I have a hard time in this school. 
2) There are books in this school. 
3) I have a good time in this school. 
(C) The news lifted me up. 
1) The news made me happy. 
2) The news made me raise my arms. 
3) The news made me sad. 
(C) Pepe has a high position in the company. 
1) Pepe lives on a high floor. 
2) Pepe’s job is very important. 
3) Pepe is very fat. 
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(N) Juan is very dense today. 
1) Juan isn’t hungry. 
2) Juan has irritated skin. 
3) Juan doesn’t understand things well. 
(C) I love Maria’s velvety voice. 
1) Maria is wearing a scarf on her neck. 
2) Maria is hoarse from talking so much. 
3) Maria has a pleasant voice. 
(C) My friend has a screw loose. 
1) When they made my friend, they forgot to put a screw in. 
2) My friend does a lot of silly and stupid things. 
3) My friend’s computer is missing a screw. 
(N) The classroom was a zoo. 
1) The children were working quietly. 
2) The teacher was a monkey. 
3) The children were running and playing. 
(N) The child is down in the dumps. 
1) The child fell down. 
2) The child is sad.  
3) The child is a little clumsy. 
(C) Luis doesn’t grasp the idea. 
1) Luis can’t hold it in his hand. 
2) Luis doesn’t understand the explanation. 
3) Luis dropped something. 
(N) Quique was feeling low.  
1) Quique was sitting on the floor.  
2) Quique was touching the ground.  
3) Quique was sad. 
(N) During the argument, Pedro really attacked Maria. 
1) Pedro was very critical of Maria. 
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2) Pedro hit Maria.  
3) Pedro didn’t want to argue with Maria. 
(C) Juan wasted his time. 
1) Juan lost a valuable watch. 
2) Juan used his time for something useless. 
3) Juan couldn’t find something valuable he had lost. 
(N) The conversation with Rachel flowed. 
1) Rachel drools a lot when she talks.  
2) Rachel is a good swimmer. 
3) Rachel expresses herself well when she talks. 
(C) Time is golden. 
1) Time goes by very slowly. 
2) Time is important. 
3) The weather is nice today.  
(N) Antonio lost the thread of the conversation. 
1) Antonio doesn’t know what the conversation was about. 
2) Antonio could not sew a type of clothing. 
3) Antonio spoke in a very soft voice.  
(C) Ana had high hopes. 
1) Ana had great hopes and expectations. 
2) Ana shot an arrow high in the air. 
3) Ana doesn’t know how to hold a shotgun. 






Table 1.  
Group differences in the overall performance (correct answers and response time) on the metaphor test. 























 ASD TCD TLD F2, 63 2 Differences between groups 
        
Correct answers M 7.68 17.50 12.68 37.57** .543 ASD< TLD, TCD; 
TLD< TCD SD 4.30 1.84 4.52   
Response time M 512.13 240.36 357.22 23.93** .431 ASD> TLD, TCD; 




Means and standard deviations obtained by the groups in their performance on the two metaphor types 
(conventional and novel) included in the metaphor test. 
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Figure 1. Within-group differences in the performance on the two metaphor types (conventional and novel) 
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